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Three Types of Non-Perceptuals in Theaetetus 185b-186c 
I 
The distinction between perception and thought as two different faculties of 
the mind is one of the most important and lasting contributions of Plato to the 
history of philosophy. Its origin is to be found in Theaetetus 184b-187a1, where the 
proper objects for each of faculty are discriminated. While some things, like sounds, 
colors, and tastes, are considered by the mind through the organs of the senses; 
there is another type of things that the mind considers autonomously without 
mediation of those organs. Elements in the second category, like being, are 
preconditions for several philosophical enterprises, such as getting truth, and, more 
relevant for the purposes of the dialogue, attaining knowledge. I am going to call 
the elements in this second category non-perceptuals, as they cannot be grasped 
through perceptual organs.  
Since the scholarship attention has been focused in addressing other aspects of 
the passage, it seems to me that the conception of non-perceptuals that Plato hints 
in 185b-186c has not yet received complete appreciation. Certainly, previous 
explorations to the text have revealed certain features of the non-perceptual things, 
but a more direct reconstruction of the views that are suggested in the passage 
remains to be undertaken. The objective of this paper is to advance a first attempt 
to carry out this project, i.e. to provide an elucidation of the views about non-
perceptual features that can be extracted from the Theaetetus 185b-186c. My main 
claim is that the mainstream reading of the passage overlooks an important 
distinction among three different types of non-perceptuals. The argument is 
advanced as follows. I begin by presenting the discussion carried out in 184b-187a 
(section II). Then, I put forth two versions of what I call the reductionist 
assumption, the view that non-perceptuals conforms a unified category (section 
III). The rejection of the first version of the reductionist assumption (section IV), 
allows me to introduce and justify the three categories I just mentioned (section V). 
The objections against the rejection of the second version of the assumption fourth 
one will provide us with a sketchy characterization of those types and the the way 
in which they are grasped by the soul (section VI). A summary of the results of this 
exploration will be last section (VII).  
It is important to state three of limits to the scope of this paper from the outset. 
All that I attempt to here is a preliminary philosophical elucidation of a particularly 
difficult passage in the Theaetetus that improve our understanding of the moral of 
                                           
1 Unless otherwise stated, all the translations are from Margaret J. Levett’s translation, 
included in Burnyeat (1990). 
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the argument. This entail, first, that I will not be concerned with discussing the best 
translation of the Greek terms used in the passage and other philological concerns. 
Those matters will be left to the relevant specialists. Second, the best way to cohere 
the views put forth in the Theaetetus with other views held by Plato in other dialogues 
are far outside from the reach of this paper. In that sense, references to other 
Platonic works will be kept to minimum. And, third, this paper should be read as 
an exploratory work. Thus, no detailed theory of non-perceptuals is going to be 
developed here. But, even in its narrow scope, this seems to be an important task. 
Understanding the conception of non-perceptuals that Plato insinuates here not 
only provides us with a better view of his views on perception, thought, and 
knowledge. Also, if Dorothea Frede is right in her suggestion that the passage under 
discussion is an interpretative key to understand the dialogue as a whole2, the results 
of this exploration could be important for the understanding of this enigmatic work.  
II 
In Theaetetus 184-187a, Plato puts in Socrates’ words the final argument against 
Theaetetus’ proposal that knowledge be defined as sense-perception. The view 
criticized could be stated as follows: we perceive the world through the senses, this 
perception generates many sorts of beliefs, some of these beliefs are true, and some 
of those true beliefs constitute knowledge. (Cf. Tht. 151e, 184,b, and 186e). Of 
course, this view is related to number of claims that Socrates has previously made 
on the behalf of other philosophers throughout the dialogue, in particular, on behalf 
of Protagorean relativism (Cf. 166b-168c and 177c-179). I will not address those 
foreign views in this paper, and my focus will be limited to formulation I have just 
sketched.  
Plato’s opposition to the definition of knowledge as perception is carefully 
constructed in four stages. In Stage 1 (184b-185a), Socrates lays out the background 
for his objection by getting from Theaetetus the acceptance of two assumptions 
about perception. First, while asking whether we perceive with the bodily organs or 
through the bodily organs, Socrates seeks the acceptance of the implausibility of the 
idea that perception is an activity of the body. On the contrary, perception is an 
activity of the soul that it is exercises through body organs (184c-e). This idea is 
illustrated with the example of the Wooden Horse. Our senses are not like the 
soldiers in the Trojan horse, that is, many entities trapped in a single body; quite the 
opposite, all the senses belong to and converge in a single entity, the soul or the 
mind, that use them as instruments to perceive the perceptible elements in the 
world. Second, Theaetetus concedes to Socrates that each sense has its proper 
objects, which are inaccessible to the other senses (184e-185a). That is, sight can 
                                           
2 See, D. Frede (1989) 20–1 
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perceive colors and hearing perceive sounds, and those are their proper objects; but 
hearing cannot perceive colors, and eyes cannot access to sounds.  
Stage 2 (Tht. 185a-e) begins with Socrates’ suggestion that there is a thing in 
common among the all perceptibles: ‘they [all] are.’ (185a). In other words, sounds, 
colors, tastes, etc., although are grasped through different organs, they have in 
common the fact that they have being. But being is not the only one feature that 
perceptibles have in common. All perceptibles also have in common other features 
such as the fact that one perceptible is different from other things and the same as 
itself (185a); the fact they have number –i.e., that each of them is one and a couple 
of them are two (185b)–; and the fact they are similar or dissimilar (185b). But this 
argument is not limited to perceptual things. In fact, the possession of those 
features is shared by everything, or, to put it conversely, features such as having being 
and having number are features that all the things has in common. It is natural to 
call them then “commons.” At 185d, Theaetetus makes a list of those common 
features. Those are: being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, same and 
different, one and many, being odd and even, and ‘all that is involved with these 
attributes’. What is crucial from the commons is how the soul grasps them: While 
Theaetetus can identify a bodily organ capable to grasp certain perceptibles (for 
example, the taste perceives the saltiness), he is unable to find a bodily power 
capable to grasp the commons (185d). In the investigation of the common features, 
he further acknowledges, ‘the soul functions through itself’ (185e). Thus, the stage 
ends with the establishment of a crucial distinction: there are some things that the 
soul ‘considers through the bodily powers’, whereas there are other things that the 
soul considers ‘alone and through itself’ (185e).  
After giving some laudatory remarks to Theaetetus as he saved him from a vast 
amount of talk (Tht. 185e), Socrates advances to Stage 3 of his argument (186a-c). 
In this stage he formulates three sets of questions to Theaetetus. Since those are 
the crucial elements of this paper, I am going to give a detailed look to them. The 
first set includes two interrogations. To begin, at 186a, Socrates asks whether ‘being,’ 
the common ‘that accompanies everything,’ is a feature that soul grasps through the 
soul or is a feature grasped through the senses. Theaetetus places being in the first 
category. Then, he inquiries whether this classification ‘also’ applies to the others 
commons such as ‘like and unlike, same and different;’ and he gets the exact same 
answer (186a). The second group is a singleton. At 186a-b, Socrates asks about the 
classification of ‘the beautiful and ugly, good and bad.’ Theaetetus places those 
elements in the same category, but he adds an important qualification: ‘above all, I 
think that the soul examines the being they have as compared one to another. Here 
it seems to make a calculation within itself of past and present in relation to the 
future’ (186b). At this moment, Socrates stops dramatically the flow of the 
discussion –he says, ‘not so fast,’ – and he introduces the third set of elliptical, 
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interrogative remarks. He asks: ‘Wouldn’t you say that is through touch that one 
perceives the hardness of what is hard, and similarly the softness of what is soft?’ 
(186b). After obtaining Theaetetus’ agreement, he is now who introduces a 
clarification to the claim: ‘But regarding to their being –the fact they are- their 
opposition to one another, and the being, again, of this opposition, the matter is 
different. Here the soul itself attempts to reach a decision by rising to compare them 
with one another’ (186b). Furthermore, Socrates concludes the stage 3 with an 
additional clarification about who to grasp the being of hardness and softness. 
While certain things can be perceived naturally by humans and animals since their 
birth; there are other things which require ‘calculations regarding their being and 
their advantageous come, when they do, only as a result of a long and arduous 
development, involving a good deal of trouble and education’ (186c). As I 
understand it, this remark is meant to be applied only to the things in sets of 
questions. This reading will be justified below. 3  
Finally, in Stage 4 (Tht. 186c-187a), Socrates uses the former distinction to 
provide the final case against Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge. His reasoning, 
one of clearest in the dialogue, is the following: Given that attaining being is a 
precondition of attaining truth, and truth is a precondition for attaining knowledge 
(186c), hence, knowledge cannot be found in the experiences; instead, it should be 
found in the process of reasoning about those experiences, which is the way in 
which the soul access to truth and being (186d). Socrates continues getting 
Theaetetus to accept that the distinctions that they have agreed undermine his 
definition of knowledge as perception. The definitive conclusion of this argument 
is that knowledge should no be found in the faculty of sense perception, but ‘in the 
activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are’ (187a). Now 
Theaetetus proposal is successfully refuted: Perception cannot be identified not 
knowledge.  
III 
Despite the great interest that this passage has attracted,4 the scholarship has 
almost neglected the discussion Plato’s views about the non-perceptibles. 
Contemporary discussions of the passage has been mainly focused in three issues: 
                                           
3 Section VI. 
4 The contemporary discussion of this passage initiated with John M. Cooper’s seminal paper 
(1970), which challenged the classical readings of the passage advocated by Francis M. Cornford; 
(1935) 102–9 After the publication of this paper, it is not only a small exaggeration to say that 
most of the academic discussion has been occupied with developing or rejecting Cooper’s views. 
The most important works on this passage are: Holland (1973); McDowell (1973) 185–193; 
Burnyeat (1976); Modrak (1981); Shea (1985); M. Frede (1987); Bostock (1988) 110–145; Fine 
(1988); Burnyeat (1990) 52–60; Silverman (1990); Bobonich (2002) 295–331; Sedley (2004) 105–
114; Chappell (2004) 141–150; Lorenz (2006) 74–95; Loot (2011)  
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(i) providing an account of Plato’s theory notion of perception, (ii) determining the 
notion of belief (doxa) that is implied in the argument, and, (iii) explaining the notion 
being and process of the soul to grasp it. Regarding (i) and (ii), existing 
interpretations fall in two groups. On the one hand, a majoritarian view which 
claims that perception and thought are two different activities of the soul, one 
realized through the senses, and one done when the should considers things by 
itself. 5 In that regard, given that perception cannot access non-perceptuals, and 
non-perceptuals are required for the formation of beliefs, then, perception cannot 
form even the simplest beliefs. On the other hand, a minority of scholars holds that 
Plato could not have mean such strong view that grasping non-perceptuals is 
required for every belief. They argue that perception can at least yield simple beliefs 
about the objects that are perceived. In that regard, the contrast in Tht. 185e is not 
between two different activities of the soul, perception and thought, but a contrast 
between two models of thought: a model that occurs when the soul considers things 
through bodily powers which yields to simple, perceptual beliefs, and a different 
model that occurs in soul’s autonomous considerations of the non-perceptuals, 
which gives rise to a different set of more complex beliefs. 6 Both interpretations 
bear a strong relationship the issues discussed on (iii). The debate here is whether 
being, one of the non-perceptuals, should interpreted as as a ‘copula’ or as 
‘existence.’7 Being-as-copula can be exemplified with ‘x is F’, where ‘being’ is the 
copula between the noun x and the property or quality F, such as in ‘Theaetetus is 
smart.’ Being-as-existence can be presented as ‘x is’ (Theaetetus is), where x having 
being should be read as x’s existence, x’s essence, or x’s objectivity. Normally, 
supporters of the first, majoritarian reading of (i)-(ii) accepts a reading the being-as-
copula formulation, while supporters of he second reading commits being-as-
existence as ground for his claim. 8  
This led us to our main concern. While being occupied on other issues9, most 
of the participants of the debate seem to rely on the idea that passage provides one 
                                           
5 See, Burneayt ‘Plato and the Grammar of Perceiving’. Others defended of this account 
includes Fine (1988); Shea (1985); M. Frede (1987); Silverman (1990) Recently, this perceptive 
received support from Lorenz (2006) 74–95; and, Bobonich (2002)  
6 This view initiated with Cooper’s influential paper (1970)) and it was accepted by Deborah 
Modrak (See, (1981)) Recently, a similar reading it has been defended by Gerson (2003) 204–213 
7 For this distinction, see Kahn (2009) 1–2 
8 Notably, Tomas Loot recently suggested an interpretation that endorses a view that 
perception cannot form beliefs (that is, the majoritarian reading), while rejecting the ‘copula’ 
account of being. See, Loot (2011) 
9 Each interpretation has to meet certain interpretative challenges. For example, they have to 
provide an account that overcome some incoherencies between the uses of some words in stages 
1-2 of the passage compared to stages 3-4, and, they must include an account of perception and 
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single type the non-perceptuals, or, at least, the all non-perceptuals are reducible to 
a single account. I will call this idea the reductionist assumption.  
To appreciate better the role of such assumption in the argument, it is helpful 
to distinguish between two versions of it. The first version takes all non-perceptuals 
as reducible to one single category. Consider for instance the classic reading 
advanced by Francis M. Cornford who understood the totality of things that the 
soul grasps without mediation of senses as Forms10. The interesting element here is 
not the idea of Form, but the fact that he unifies of the non-perceptuals in a single 
type. More contemporary scholarship, yet it rejects Cornford’s Formist reading11, 
still continues to accept the first version of the reductionist assumption. For 
example, John McDowell, David Bostock, and Deborah Modrak explicitly say that 
three sets of question that Socrates puts forth in Stage 3 (Tht. 186a-c) merely ‘add 
up’ new elements to the list of commons previously enumerated by Theaetetus in 
Stage 2 (185d)12. Clearly, the suggestion seems to be that all non-perceptuals are 
commons, and then, Plato accepts a singe type of non-perceptual whose exhaustive 
list is completed by both by Socrates and Theaetetus in the successive steps at Stages 
2 and 3.  
The second version of the assumption is more nuanced. This reading may 
recognize a variety of different types of non-perceptuals, but it gives explanatory 
priority to ‘being’ above all the others.13 There are two important textual elements 
that support this reading. One the one hand, the nature of the being is exclusively 
discussed in some passages (e.g., 185b and 186a), which seems to give the sensation 
that this non-perceptual some sort special role. On the other hand, and more 
importantly, the object that seems to be grasped all the non-perceptuals it is being. 
Notice that in the second and third questions of the Stage 3, what is grasped is ‘the 
being’ of the beautiful-ugly, good-bad, and, hardness-softness. Then, since the 
explanation of the process of grasping non-perceptuals is reducible to an 
explanation of grasping being; being cannot be put as one more of the many non-
perceptuals. Being is, for the second version, the master non-perceptual that allows 
us to grasp the others.  
To summate, while the first version is the suggestion that all non-perceptuals 
are commons; the suggestion in the second reading is that process of grasping the 
non-perceptual or explainable in reference to one master non-perceptual. In other 
                                           
belief that coheres with previous Platonic works (mainly, The Republic) or justify a change in Plato’s 
views on those matters (mainly, in The Sophist). 
10 Cornford (1935) 102–109, especially 106. 
11 I think that Cornford’s interpretation was decisively refuted by Cooper (1970) 127–8, 137–
9 
12 See, McDowell (1973) 191–2; Bostock (1988) 122, and, Modrak (1981) 37  
13 Loot (2011) 356. 
  7 
words, the former holds that non-perceptuals are one type of thing; the latter 
suggests that they may be different things, but the process to grasp them is a single 
one.  
IV 
It is my view that this reductionist assumption does not make justice to the 
complexity of this passage. I will begin by rejecting the claim that all the non-
perceptual are commons advanced by first version of the assumption, and then I 
proceed to justify three types of non-perceptuals that I find in the passage.  
The point of departure of my rejection of the first version is the explicit list of 
commons introduced by Theaetetus at 186d, which are labeled in 185e as ‘the 
common features of everything.’ That list includes being-not being, likeness and 
difference, same and different, one and many, which were not discussed in 185a-d. 
Two facts are noticeable. First, Theaetetus makes sure to include one ‘obvious’ 
common that was left (odd and even) in the second sentence of the list. This give 
us reason to think that the list is restrictive. Second, this interpretation gains weight 
when we consider that Socrates accepts the restrictive character of the list with a 
very clear language: ‘You follow me exceedingly well. These are just the things I am 
asking about’. It seems to be clear, then, that the commons are those listed in 185d, 
and not others,  
There are a couple of important conceptual reasons that gives further support 
to this reading. The ‘common features of everything’ listed in 185d are, in my 
concept, the same things ‘accompanies everything’ that Socrates suggested in 186a. 
Here, we have to be careful. When Socrates asks for second time to Theaetetus 
whether he would classify being as perceptual or a non-perceptual, the philosopher 
explains that being is, ‘above all, something that accompanies everything’ (186a). 
But it seems to be appropriate to extend this qualification to the all the commons 
listed in 185d. Notice that after obtaining from Theaetetus that being is non-
perceptual, he introduces a new question: ‘Also like and unlike, same and different?’ 
To that, Theaetetus answers unqualifiedly ‘yes’. We should take the also in this 
question as meaning that the same features of the question for the ‘being’ applies 
similarly to ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, and ‘same’ and ‘different’. If this is correct, it seems 
just natural to extend this rationale to all the other commons because, after all, they 
also are things that accompany everything. This interpretation is strengthened when 
we take into account that Theaetetus answer has no further qualifications –unlike 
in the following two questions in 186b. Therefore, the commons in 184d are the 
same are things that ‘accompanies everything’ of 185e. 
 Being a feature that ‘accompanies everything’ is a really important characteristic 
of the commons. The implication seems to be that it is not conceptually possible 
for a thing not to have one of those features; or, to put it differently; all conceptually 
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conceivable objects have, by necessity, each one of the commons. Notice that all 
conceptually conceivable things have being with regard to themselves (i.e., they are 
what they are), and, at the same time, they have do not have being of what they are 
not (i.e., they are not what they are not). Similarly happens with the other commons: 
they are similar to things of the same kind, but different from others; and so on. 
On the contrary, the other types of non-perceptuals that are mentioned in the two 
further questions of Stage 3 deserve different consideration. If we focus, for 
example, in the features of hardness and softness stated in 185b, it seems to be clear 
that not everything that exists have hardness or softness stricto sensu. If we consider 
perceptibles, it does not seem to be fully accurate to say that sound or a color is 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’; it seems to be better description of a to say that a sound is loud or 
quiet, and that a color is bright or dark. If we think in objects that cannot be grasped 
through perception, their lacking of hardness and softness is more perspicuous. 
Clearly, objects such as thoughts, numbers, and geometrical figures cannot plausibly 
be thought as having hardness or softness. If this is correct, it seems to be 
implausible that everything have hardness or softness, and it seems even less 
plausible to think that the being of hardness and softness is a feature common to 
all things. For what it is important now, then, we have established a first distinction: 
the features discussed between features pointed in the third question of Stage 3 
(hardness-softness) cannot be regarded as ‘commons’, not only because they not 
includes in the list in 182b, but also, more importantly, because they are not things 
that accompany everything.  
This interpretation requires, however, a different explanation for the second 
question of stage 3 concerning to beauty-ugliness and good-bad. Unlike hardness 
and softness, it seems plausible to think that everything is either beautiful or ugly, 
or either is good or bad. This is strengthened if we take into account Greek’s views 
of beauty and goodness; it is a common idea of Ancient Philosophy there is some 
sort of beauty and goodness even in abstract objects, human behaviours, attitudes, 
thoughts, etc.14 This seems to lead us to think that they should be considered among 
the commons. The natural question is, then, why did Plato consider those in a 
different place instead of placing them in the same list of Tht. 186d? The reasons 
for that, I think, is related to the way in which those features are grasped. This is 
the most important reason to differentiate between the commons and other non-
perceptibles. The process grasping of the commons seems much simpler than the 
process of grasping beauty-ugly and goodness-badness, where the soul needs to 
make a ‘calculation within itself of past and present in relation to future’. Hence, it 
may be true that the features of the second question as possessed by everything, 
but that does not transform them in commons; the process for grasping them is 
                                           
14 See our discussion about beauty in section VI. 
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much complex than the process of grasping the features listed in 185d. It is clear, 
then, that not all the non-perceptuals are commons. 
V 
By rejecting the first reading of the reductionist assumption, we are now in a 
better position to appreciate a distinction that was subtly introduced in Theaetetus 
185b-186c. Instead of being one single type of non-perceptuals, there are three 
categories of them. We can only appreciate this distinction when we are active 
readers as Plato requires from us, that is, when we take note of the form and 
structure of the argument, when we are alert in detecting verbal standpoints and 
sub-textual evidence, and we when complete the argument by own our 
consideration.  
The justification of this distinction begins with a closer look to the three sets of 
questions in stage 3. At this moment, Socrates and Theaetetus already agree on the 
distinction between perceptuals and non-perceptuals. What Plato does in each of 
the sets of elliptical questions is developing a new category of non-perceptuals.  
The first set, at Tht. 186a -where Socrates asks about being, like-unlike, same-
different- is merely a repetition of the commons that were listed in 185b. What is 
crucial to stress here is the relationship between the two questions that is expressed 
relationship is expressed by the word ‘also’ that connects them. As I have argued 
above15, the qualification that Socrates introduces for being in 186b, i.e., that is a 
thing that ‘accompanies everything’, applies as well to the features mentioned in the 
second question. Hence, it is plausible to think that this applies also to all the 
commons listed in 185b. Here we have the first type of non-perceptuals: the 
commons, the features that apply to everything. A very important point to notice is 
that there is no indication on how the commons are to be grasped. Once again, 
unlike to second and third set of questions, the first set ends without further 
qualifications. If the principle ubi Plato non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus is wise 
principle to apply here,16 then we have reason to think that the commons are 
grasped directly by the soul. That is, if the Plato has not pointed a special mental 
process to grasp the commons, we must assume that they are grasped in the 
simplest way possible.  
The second set is conformed by a single elliptical question and its answer (186b). 
The question concerning to beautiful-ugly, and good-bad is introduced with the 
words ‘what about.’ What Plato means by this is that there is not continuity between 
the first set and of the second; that is, the features that apply to the second set does 
not apply to the first one. The most relevant part of the passage is Theaetetus’ 
                                           
15 See, above, section IV. 
16 Here, I am paraphrasing the principle for legal interpretation contained in Digesta 6,2,8: ubi 
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.  
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answer. Here, he begins to qualify the second set claiming that the being of those 
features is grasped by ‘compar[ing] with one another’. One may argue that this 
opposition seems to connect the second set with the commons because. Recall that 
also in grasping the being of the commons, the understanding of some opposition. 
For example, there is an opposition between being and not-being, and similar and 
dissimilar. As this second set also include opposition, this seems to be a reason to 
connect them with commons. This does not seem to me a decisive element that 
justifies that the second set should be included among the commons. As we will 
explain in moment17, the grasping of some opposition is needed among all the non-
perceptibles. More importantly, accepting the unity between the second set and 
commons will overlook the crucial element is second sentence of the qualification, 
where Theaetetus explains the particular way in which this second type of non-
perceptibles are grasped: For grasping beauty-ugliness and good-bad, the soul ‘seems 
to be making a calculation within itself of past and present in relation to future’ (Tht. 186b). In 
other words, the crucial step in considering the features listed in the second 
question is not through considering the ‘opposition’ in them; but, instead, through 
considering their being in a particular way: through a calculation in time. As the 
most important element relevant is a temporal calculation, it seems appropriate to 
dub this second group as temporal things.  
Finally, the introduction of the third and last set of questions (186b-c) is a 
slightly more abrupt. With the expression ‘eche dê,’ which is translated at ‘not so fast, 
now’ (Levett) or ‘hold on’ (McDowell), Socrates elliptically asks Theaetetus about 
considering the hardness and softness of things. I agree with McDowell that his 
express is introduced to indicate to Theaetetus that he is danger of missing an 
important point18. Let us examine carefully the passage. At the beginning, by stating 
the soul perceives hardness and softness by mediation of the bodily organs, Socrates 
reinforces the previous point that the soul consider perceptuals through senses. The 
point here is not to restate a previously introduced distinction. It is important to 
notice that the particular perceptuals has been meticulously chosen: Socrates does 
not pick out perceptuals which lack of opposites, such as a color (yellow) or a sound 
(the note ‘A#’); he selects a perceptual that has a clear opposite, i.e. the hardness or 
softness of a material object. Let us call the latter oppositional perceptuals. The 
crucial point of the passage is to be found in the second question. Here, when 
Socrates clarifies that the consideration of the being of the oppositional perceptuals 
can only be grasped by the soul, explains very carefully that the process to grasp the 
being: ‘Here the soul itself attempts to reach a decision by rising to compare them with one another’. 
(Tht. 186b). What I understand here, is that Socrates distinguishes between (a) the 
being of the oppositional perceptual itself and (b) the being of the opposition of 
                                           
17 See, Section VI.  
18 McDowell (1973) 109 
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that is derived from this perceptual, which is a non-perceptual thing. While (a) is a 
normal common, (b) is a different type of non-perceptual at the intersection 
between perceptuals and no-perceptuals19.  
The most what it is important thing now is that we have found a third category 
of non-perceptual different from the commons and the temporal things: while the 
former are grasped directly and the later grasped in calculation of the part and 
future, this third group by an oppositional calculus. Moreover, the first two 
categories are non-perceptuals simpliciter, this third category contains elements of a 
very particular sort: they are non-perceptual derived from a special type of 
perceptual, i.e., oppositional perceptual. Therefore, it is completely clear that there 
the first reading was a completely mistaken assumption. Instead of being one single 
category of non-perceptuals, there are three types instead: The common things, the 
temporal, and, the being of oppositional things.  
VI 
Now, let us turn our attention now to the second reading of the reductionist 
assumption. Despite its complexity and the textual evidence for it, I think this 
second reading is not convincing for two reasons that could be explained succinctly. 
The first reason is very simple. When Theaetetus collects his lists of commons at 
Tht. 185d, he positions ‘being’ in the same level as ‘like and unlike’ and ‘one and 
many,’ and the others. Also, as I have already noticed, Socrates accepts this list very 
happily by clarifying that that those, and not others, are the commons that interest 
him. It seems to be clear, then, that no special place is given to being by Theaetetus 
or Socrates. Relatedly, the fact that there are some questions concerned exclusive 
to being, it is easily explained by the very structure of the argument: Plato uses 
successive questions to introduce new elements in his argument. In the case of 
being, this is just apparent both in the succession of questions before 185d -where 
Socrates inquires fist about being (185a-c), and then about like and unlike and other 
commons (185b)-, and the successions of questions after the lists, whose nuances 
were explained in sections IV and V of this paper.  
The second reason is much more complex and important. The fact that being 
is mentioned in all the questions in Stage 3 does not count as decisive evidence for 
the second version. Since Being is a common, and, as such, it is a feature that 
everything has; it is only a platitude to point that the oppositional and calculational 
things have being. What it is really important to notice is Plato stresses on the idea 
that are many important differences in the way we grasp being as common, or being 
simpliciter, from the way we grasp the being of the temporal and oppositional non-
perceptuals. In other words, Plato’s characterization of being simpliciter is much 
                                           
19 I will return to his matter in section VI. 
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different from his characterisation of the being of non-oppositional. What is are 
exactly three different ways to the being of non-perceptuals? We already know that 
commons are grasped directly, a temporal things require a temporal calculus, and 
oppositional things requires an oppositional calculus. Let me provide a general 
overview of these three different processes of the soul. 
First off, the way in which the being simpliciter is grasped is very 
straightforward. We already have pointed that there is no explanation of how 
commons are grasped. The suggestion seems to be that being simpliciter and the 
other commons are grasped directly, that is, only by thinking about the object, 
without any type of temporal or oppositional calculation, we grasp the respective 
non-perceptual.  
Second, let us move now to account the temporal things, a more interesting 
group that include beauty-ugliness and good-bad. The natural question seems to be: 
how a can a feature be grasped to a calculation of past and future? To explain this 
enigmatic calculus, I am going to set aside the account of goodness and basses20, 
and I will concentrate in beauty-ugliness. More particularly, I will give a closer look 
to the passage where Socrates praises Theaetetus (185e). The relevant statement is 
the following, according to Mrs. Levett’s translation: ‘Yes, Theaetetus, you would 
say that, because you are handsome and not ugly as Theodorus would have it. For 
handsome is as handsome says.’ Unfortunately, Levett’s translation does not allow 
us to appreciate of the passage for two aspects21. First, the word translated in the 
first sentence as ‘handsome’ is the Greek word kalos, which is commonly translated 
as beautiful. This modification conceals the previous appearances of the word in 
the dialogue.22 Second, there seems to be a small mistranslation in the second 
sentence. Mrs. Levett uses the say word for Theaetetus and his speech (handsome), 
while the word used to characterise the speech is the adverb kalôs, not the adjective 
kalos. So it seems to be better translated as ‘he ‘speaks handsomely’ (ho kalôs legon). 
With those remarks in mind, it seems to me that a more accurate translation of the 
passage following: ‘Yes, Theaetetus, you would say that because you are beautiful 
(kalos) and not ugly (aischros), as Theodorus was saying. For someone who speaks 
beautifully (ho kalôs legon) is beautiful (kalos) and good (agathos)’. 
                                           
20 I am going to explain by focusing in beauty and ugliness. The reason to exclude goodness 
from the current discussion is derived from the very special role they play role in the dialogue. It 
seems to be that the calculation being of the good is introduced with the intention to refute some 
views that Socrates puts forward on behalf of Protagoras in 142, 166-8 and 177-9. Since a proper 
discussion of the notions of goodness and badness would require explaining with its proper 
object, I cannot make justice to the richness of this notion here. 
21 See, Boeri (2006) 61, n.7 and 182, n. 201  
22 As we will see in a moment, the word was previously translated as beautiful at Tht. 142 and 
143.  
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Now, when those terms are clarified what we see find here an clear example of 
the calculation used by the soul to grasp the temporal being. Recall the beginning of 
the dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus. At 144e, Theodorus, Theaetetus’ 
master, when he was introducing his pupil to the philosopher, he said that the young 
mathematician was not kalos (beautiful, in Mrs. Levett’s translation). This seems to 
be an accurate description of his physical appearance, as Theaetetus has certain 
resemblances to Socrates. (see, Tht. 144e). However, after making a ‘calculation’ or 
‘consideration’ of Theaetetus’ being, this ended not being truth (see, 145b, 148e, 
151c): Socrates found that, contrary the appearances, that Theaetetus was in fact 
beautiful. The most important thing to notice here is that Socrates’ soul grasps the 
being of Theaetetus’ in the same way he explains at 186b. That is, Theaetetus’ 
beauty is grasped through a calculation of the past and present in relation to future. 
The past and present here are the remarks about Theaetetus’ appearance made by 
Theodorus. The future here is related to the kind of person that Theaetetus will 
become. To see it, we should recall that Socrates told Euclides, one of the characters 
of the background dialogue, that Theaetetus, a person with an impressive natural 
ability, will become an individual from whom ‘we should inevitably hear more’ in 
the future (146c-d). Socrates judgement, as the good prophet he was, ended up 
being correct. By the time of Theaetetus’ death, he has deemed to be kalos and 
agathos by everybody (142b). 
For reasons of space and time, I am not going to discuss here the third topic 
and the comments about the value of my objections (one additional page excluded). 
VII 
Now, it is time to conclude. In that paper, I have defended an interpretation of 
Socrates’ final refutation of the argument of Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as 
perception, which I expect, brings to the light an important element: the distinction 
between three types of things: the commons the temporal things, and the oppositional 
things. Now, we are in a position to see that perception cannot be knowledge 
because it cannot attain commons, it ccanot calculate, and it cannot understand 
opposition. Only thought can do that. Those are, I think, important elements to 
complete our account of Plato’s theories of thought and perception. Yet 
provisional, the former results seem to be interesting way to explore these notions 
in the future.  
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